Evidence from the Medicaid buy-in program, a series of large Medicaid expansions targeted to workers with disabilities, can inform the expected effects of the 2014 Medicaid expansions and current proposals to reform Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). In states with low income thresholds for Aged, Blind, Disabled Medicaid, expanding Medicaid through the buy-in program resulted in large increases in Medicaid eligibility for DI recipients. Using those states with little to no increase in Medicaid eligibility as comparison states, I find expanding access to Medicaid yields large take up rates among DI recipients. However, these large responses are only expected to occur in a few states following the 2014 expansion because of the interaction between existing buy-in programs, Aged, Blind, Disabled Medicaid, and the set of states enacting the 2014 expansion. Evidence from the buy-in program also informs proposals to increase work among DI recipients. Rewarding work is shown to increase the employment of DI recipients, but there is no evidence of increased earnings.
Introduction
Between 1997 and 2009, 43 states adopted a Medicaid buy-in program. These programs are large Medicaid expansions with the goal of increasing work effort among individuals with disabilities. Examining the impact of the Medicaid buy-in programs on the take up of Medicaid among a group of adults with disabilities, Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) recipients can inform the expected effects of the 2014 Medicaid expansions. In January 2014, many lowincome adults will gain access to health insurance through the Affordable Care Act (ACA). In states that choose to expand Medicaid, adults with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level will be eligible for Medicaid. As with the expansion of any public program, there are questions of how sizable take up will be. Since individuals with disabilities (or who are aged or blind) comprise the bulk of Medicaid costs, it is especially important to understand program participation among individuals with disabilities. In this paper, I provide estimates of the expected impact of the 2014 Medicaid expansions on Medicaid receipt among DI recipients.
Evidence on the effect of the Medicaid buy-in on the employment and earnings of DI recipients also inform recent proposals to reform DI. Under current program rules, DI recipients lose cash benefits after demonstrating sustained earnings above the Social Security Administration (SSA) threshold, called "Substantial Gainful Activity" (SGA), and this results in strong work disincentives. Efforts within SSA and other reform proposals attempt to address these programmatic concerns about work disincentives by supporting and rewarding work among those with substantial work capacity (Autor and Duggan, 2010; Burkhauser and Daly, 2011; Mann and Stapleton, 2011) .
1 One central question is whether providing financial rewards (in conjunction with work supports, such as retraining and accommodation) will effectively increase employment.
In nearly half of the states that adopt the Medicaid buy-in, Medicaid receipt is contingent upon work. 2 Medicaid health insurance provides real financial rewards for dual eligible (Medicare/Medicaid) recipients, Medicaid subsidizes Medicare cost sharing expenses in addition to covering services that are not Medicare benefits. Therefore, in states in which Medicaid benefits do not continue during periods of non-work, access to Medicaid explicitly acts as a financial reward to work, and evidence on the impact of increased access to Medicaid in these states can inform how rewarding work impacts employment and earnings of DI recipients.
A greater understanding of the impact of rewarding work on the employment and earnings of DI recipients is especially important because although there is recent evidence that many DI recipients have substantial work capacity (Maestas et al., 2013; von Wachter, et al., 2011) , prior demonstrations to increase work among DI recipients has been met with low participation rates. For example, the Ticket to Work program which provides work supports to job seekers and incorporated temporary incentives to work yielded participation rates of only 1.8 percent (Stapleton et al., 2008) . There are important differences between the Ticket to Work program and the work supports described in the DI proposals, however. Ticket to Work programs provide enhanced work incentives by allowing recipients to earn more than SGA and preserve their full cash benefit for nine months before losing cash benefits entirely. For example, these benefits only temporarily increase incentives to work as the individual works his or her way off of the program. 3 Some proposals for work supports in DI reform provide permanent work supports and they all increase the return to working. 4 Therefore, by rewarding work for longer than nine months, the reward for work in the Medicaid buy-in is closer to the work rewards being proposed than the Ticket to Work program. Receipt of Medicaid benefits through the buy-in are not time limited, so they reward work as long as the recipient continues to be employed. 4 Autor and Duggan (2010) propose work rewards that continue for 24 months, nearly three times as long as the current work supports (9 months). 5 Kostol and Mogstad (2013) provide evidence that rewarding work increased employment among DI recipients in Norway. 6 This assumes the DI recipient wishes to retain access to cash benefits. Liu and Stapleton (2010) show that only 3.7 percent of DI recipient leave the rolls for work. DI recipients face program rules that discourage work because recipients who earn more than SGA income threshold, eventually lose cash benefits. 10 SGA is also used by the SSA to determine eligibility for DI benefits, and this income threshold is also important to DI recipients considering employment because once an individual has lost DI cash benefits, they remain eligible for their full cash benefit in any month their earnings fall below SGA. This extended period of eligibility lasts for 36 months. As shown in Figure 2 , between 1999 and 2009, the years in the present analysis, SGA was approximately 100 percent of the federal poverty level for 9 States adopting the buy-in program under the Balanced Budget Act typically implemented the buy-in first and pursued MIG funding second. This is likely because most of these buy-in programs were developed prior to or directly after the passage of the Ticket Act. States that adopted the buy-in program under the Ticket Act, however, initially used the MIG funding to establish Medicaid buy-in programs (Kehn et al., 2010) . 10 The level of earnings that triggers the process of working the way off of DI is actually lower, approximately 75% of the federal poverty level for single householders, as shown in Appendix Figure 1 . DI recipients who earn more than this amount in a month begin the "Trial Work Period," and if their earnings exceed this amount for any 9 out of the next 60 months, SSA considers that the individual's disability has ended and the recipient loses access to cash benefits (though for the 36-month "Extended Period of Eligibility" former DI recipients receive their full cash benefit in months that their earnings dip below SGA). matters is whether the higher income threshold increases eligibility for those earnings less than SGA. Therefore, in years where SGA exceeds the income threshold for Aged, Blind, Disabled Medicaid, the effects of the buy-in will be understated. 12 Beneficiaries may have earnings below SGA for one of two reasons: they may be earning as much as they can (which happens to fall below SGA) or they may be "parking" their earnings below SGA, that is, purposefully restricting their earnings below that threshold so that they do not lose DI benefits. Schimmel et al. (2011) find some evidence of DI beneficiaries parking below SGA, though the effect is small; only between 0.2 and 0.4 percent of all DI beneficiaries were parked below SGA level. 13 Although these three states have large state populations, this enrollment is also a large percentage of the state population, ranging from 0.2 to 0.33 percent of the state population. Iowa enrolled over 15,000 participants in 2009, 0.52 percent of the state population.
Evidence of the Impact of the Medicaid Buy-In on Employment and Earnings. The bulk
of the existing literature examines the impact of the buy-in program on employment and earnings. Coe and Rupp (2013) examine the impact of the presence of the buy-in program on employment, exits from DI, and earnings of all DI recipients, and they find small increases in employment in states that adopt buy-in programs. The authors also examine whether the effects are stronger among DI recipients most likely to benefit from supplemental insurance/participate in the buy-in program, such as those with nonzero medical expenditures (who might benefit from supplemental insurance) or those without supplemental insurance. They find that the presence of a state buy-in program on employment is largest for those with positive medical expenditures and those without supplemental insurance, which is consistent with the buy-in impacting those who would benefit the most from it. However, they find no evidence that the buy-in increases the probability a recipient earns more than SGA or earns enough to generate economic independence from the cash benefits.
Descriptive evidence is consistent with these findings: that the buy-in program increases employment but does not increase earnings by a large enough amount to generate economic selfsufficiency (see, e.g., Henry et al., 2006; Liu and Ireys, 2006) . Henry et al. (2006) find that individuals with developmental disabilities or mental illness were the most likely to work but had lower earnings levels, and they find a low incidence of earnings high enough to lead to selfsufficiency among all buy-in participants. There is also suggestive descriptive evidence that program features matter. Liu and Ireys (2006) document that the share of buy-in participants with increased earnings varies across states and note that programmatic features of buy-in programs might be responsible for some of these differences in outcomes. For example,
Medicaid is suspended during periods of non-work in three of the states in which an especially large share of participants increase their earnings. Liu and Ireys (2006) 
where Medicaid equals one of the individual receives Medicaid and PostBuyIn equals one in the years the state has adopted the buy-in program. The variable IncMcaidEligToFPL equals one in states in which the buy-in program resulted in increases in Medicaid eligibility for income levels below 100 percent of the federal poverty level for a single householder. 
To test whether the effects vary depending upon whether states explicitly reward work, I
separately examine the impact of the buy-in in states that do and do not allow recipients to maintain their Medicaid benefits during periods of non-work. In states that tie Medicaid receipt to employment, benefits through the buy-in program reward work. As shown in Table 2 , approximately 70 percent of the DI recipients in the MCBS also receive Medicaid. Employment rates are rather low; 14 percent of respondents in the sample were employed at the time of interview. This figure is slightly lower than the share of cash disability recipients who are working reported in Coe and Rupp (2013) , though this is not surprising because the MCBS asks respondents whether they were employed at the time of the interview whereas Coe and Rupp (2013) Among states in which the buy-in represented a sizable increase in Medicaid eligibility for DI recipients (columns (1) and (2)), the buy-in increased Medicaid receipt by 11 percentage points and employment by 4 percentage points. In contrast, in states in which the buy-in did not 22 Among workers, 58 percent report income higher than SGA. The variable describing income in the MCBS is income_c, "Actual income of SP" (RIC 1), which does not distinguish between earned and unearned income.
Respondents are directed to report income from jobs as well as DI benefits in their response, which likely explains why such a high share of working respondents report annual income greater than SGA.
appreciably increase Medicaid eligibility (columns (3) and (4) There are also gains in the likelihood that an individual earns more than SGA, but only modest gains in monthly income, conditional on working. Table 3 In columns (2) and (3) I test for heterogeneous effects by the presence of protections for continued Medicaid receipt during periods of non-work. In column (2), I restrict the sample to the set of states with protections for periods of non-work. In every case, the impact of a higher income threshold on Medicaid receipt is nearly twice as large in these states as it is in all states.
Results

Impact of Buy-In on Medicaid Receipt.
Then it follows that the results in column (3) From a base of 56 percent of the sample receiving Medicaid prior to the buy-in, this corresponds to a 74 percent take up rate.
Impact of Buy-In on Employment and Earnings.
Evidence from the Medicaid buy-in can also inform the expected effects of DI reforms on the employment and earnings of DI recipients. Table 4 contains estimates of the impact of higher income thresholds on employment. I find that it is only the states that explicitly reward work with Medicaid (i.e., those states with the strictest work requirements) that experience a positive and statistically significant increase in employment following buy-in implementation. There is no effect in the pooled sample of all buy-in states or in the subset of states with weaker work requirements. However, as shown in column (3), raising the income threshold for Medicaid through the buy-in increases employment among DI recipients by between 4.6 and 7.6 percentage points in those states that explicitly reward work. From a mean of 8 percent of DI recipients working in these states prior to the buyin, this is between a 57.5 and 95 percent increase in the rate of employment. This suggests that the employment of DI recipients responds to increased rewards for work.
In Table 5 , I present results examining the impact of the increased eligibility for Medicaid on income. Panel A presents the results for all states. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the recipient reports income above SGA. 23 Column (1) includes all survey respondents and I find no effect of the buy-in on income.
Any increase in employment may impact the distribution of earnings, so in column (2) I restrict the sample to those who are working at the time of the survey and find no evidence that increased Medicaid eligibility results in a statistically significant effect on the likelihood that income exceeds the SGA threshold. However, there may be important gains in earnings that are not reflected by this binary measure that quantifies changes around the SGA threshold. For example, someone's earnings might increase from $400 per month to $600 per month, both of which are below SGA and would not be reflected in the prior estimates. 24 Therefore, in column (3), I examine whether the buy-in impacted ln(annual income) among the subset of workers.
Again, I find no effect of the buy-in on income.
These findings of a null effect on income could arise for one of two reasons. Increased eligibility for Medicaid may have no impact on earnings. Alternatively, it could reflect the mean of two offsetting effects: if earnings increase among those already employed but new workers have lower average earnings. To try to tease out these effects, I separately examine the impact of increased Medicaid eligibility on earnings in states where there were no observed gains in employment and those states where the increased eligibility resulted in employment gains. In Panel B, I restrict the sample to those states that allow recipients to continue to receive Medicaid during periods of non-work. Table 3 showed no buy-in induced employment gains in these states, and I document no gains in income in this subset of states. In Panel C, I restrict the sample to those states with strict work requirements, the set of states with observed employment gains as a result of the increased Medicaid eligibility. As expected, the coefficient estimates in Panel C show that income actually declines as a result of increased Medicaid eligibility in these states. If individuals are entering the labor force to acquire Medicaid insurance coverage, but have lower average earnings, this increased employment will lower mean income. These findings suggest that income supports will help workers with disabilities make ends meet.
Discussion
Using MCBS data, I examine whether increasing access to Medicaid for DI recipients through buy-in programs impacts Medicaid receipt, employment, and earnings. I find sizable increases in Medicaid receipt in those states which enacted large increases in eligibility, and find the largest increases are in states that allow buy-in participants to preserve access to Medicaid during periods of non-work. However, I find that the only increases in employment are in those states that explicitly reward work (i.e., do not allow buy-in participants to continue to receive Medicaid during periods of non-work). This suggests that DI recipients respond to work incentives. Further, I find no evidence of increases in income. If anything, the buy-in induces individuals to enter the labor force with lower earning potential and these individuals bring down average annual income. even though I draw the estimates from the set of states which continue benefits during periods of non-work, there are likely some DI recipients with low work capacity who will also take up Medicaid in 2014 who did not seek Medicaid under the buy-in (which was targeted to workers with disabilities). Further, the buy-in programs were likely not as widely publicized as the 2014
Medicaid expansions will be.
Evidence from the buy-in also informs efforts to reform DI. Consistent with recent research (Maestas et al., 2013; von Wachter et al., 2011) , these findings suggest that many nonworking DI recipients may actually be able to work. Current proposals and the Benefit Offset National Demonstration project will reward work by allowing recipients to continue to receive benefits while working (Autor and Duggan, 2010; Burkhauser and Daly, 2011; Mann and Stapleton, 2011) . The evidence from this paper suggests that efforts to reward work will lead to higher employment rates. The only states in which employment increased along with Medicaid eligibility were the states that rewarded work with Medicaid receipt (by explicitly tying benefit to employment).
This increase in work, however, is not generating earnings greater than SGA. Therefore, income supports, which are a part of the proposals, are crucial. Source: Kehn et al., (2010) ; Kehn (2013) Table 2 . Additional covariates include the state unemployment rate, respondent age, gender, indicators for race and ethnicity (white, black, Hispanic, the left out category is non-white, non-black, non-Hispanic), indicators for level of education received (no high school, some high school, some college, and college or more, the left out category is high school degree), veteran status, indicators for primary diagnosis (back/spine/disc disorder, severe eyesight loss, severe hearing loss, kidney/renal failure, seizure disorder, car/bike/train accident, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, broken bone, cerebral palsy, hardening of the arteries, high blood pressure, myocardial infarction, angina pectoris, other heart condition, stroke, new occurrence of skin cancer, cancer or other tumor, diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, other arthritis, mental retardation, Alzheimer's disease, mental disorder, osteoporosis, broken hip, Parkinson's disease, emphysema or asthma, partial paralysis, loss of limb, congenital heart failure, problems with heart valve, heartbeat rhythm, and depression (beginning in 2009), the left out category is other) an indicator for the presence of a second diagnosis, and state and year fixed effects. Table 3 . In the MCBS, only annual income is reported, so consider income to exceed SGA if annual income is greater than 12*SGA for the given year. Note that in the MCBS, unearned income, such as Social Security Disability Benefits, is included in the income measure.
